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EU governance is experiencing a shift towards soft governance frameworks that incorporate 
‘harder’ elements. Using a qualitative case study approach and an original set of elite 
interviews, we examine two policy areas – health and energy – where similar such architectures 
– the European Semester and the Energy Union Governance Regulation – are now core 
governance tools. Three research questions are addressed: (1) What mechanisms are employed 
to harden these governance frameworks? (2) What is driving this shift? And, drawing on the 
more extensive experience of the Semester, (3) What lessons can be drawn for energy policy? 
We establish the experimentalist nature of these two governance architectures and identify a 
mix of ‘harder soft governance’ (HSG) mechanisms used in both cases. We show that, although 
similar in structure, the shift towards HSG frameworks is driven by different factors in each 
case. The more extensive experience of the Semester in health points to the importance of 
concrete implementation practices; the power of specificity to strengthen soft commitments; 
the role of policy coupling as a lever for implementation; the potential influence of strategic 
entrepreneurs; the role of politicisation in pressuring change; and the significance of periodic 
revision as windows of opportunity for incremental change.  
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Soft governance frameworks such as the Open Method Coordination (OMC) were introduced 
in the 1990s to address the legitimacy challenges faced by the traditional Community Method 
and to circumvent gaps in European Union (EU) competence, which made authority-based 
governance legally and politically unacceptable (Eberlein & Kerwer, 2004). Although they 
enjoyed some success, their reliance on the willingness of national governments to initiate 
policy change has limited compliance (Mosher & Trubek, 2003). In order to address this 
common weakness, a strengthening of soft governance is being seen across several EU policy 
areas (Graziano & Halpern, 2016; Ringel & Knodt, 2018), notably through the ‘layering’ of 
more hierarchical mechanisms onto existing soft governance frameworks (de la Porte & Heins, 
2016). This has been conceptualised as a distinct ‘harder soft’ mode of governance (HSG) 
whereby policy instruments with a soft basis – such as voluntary commitments, peer review or 
policy monitoring – are supplemented with a harder element – for instance, by making the 
outcomes of peer review public to name and shame laggards, or by applying sanctions where 
monitoring reveals shortcomings (see Knodt & Schoenefeld, 2020).  
A prime example of this trend is the European Semester. Mirroring many features of the OMC 
(see De la  Porte & Stiller, 2020), the Semester is an annual cycle of macro-economic analysis, 
reporting, recommendations and evaluation, hardened by the potential for sanctions where 
member states fail to implement recommendations (Bekker, 2020). After almost a decade of 
operation, the Semester has become core to the EU’s economic governance, influencing a wide 
range of sectors, such as health, where EU competencies had remained limited. It now serves 
as a blueprint for other, specific policy sectors. For instance, the new Regulation on the 
Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (hereafter Governance Regulation), 
adopted in 2018, is partly modelled on the Semester.  
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This article is based on the observation that sensitive and comparatively ‘new’ fields of 
European integration, such as health and energy, have seen the introduction of governance 
architectures which combine hard and soft law elements in new ways. It addresses three 
research questions: (1) what harder mechanisms are embedded in the Semester as applied to 
health and in the new energy governance framework?; (2) what is driving this shift towards 
‘hardening’ these soft governance frameworks; and, given the longer experience of health 
policy within the Semester, (3) what lessons can be drawn for the future development of energy 
policy?   
The article first outlines the analytical framework, which combines Experimentalist 
Governance - a primarily soft model of governance - with the HSG framework to map and 
explain the hardening of governance architectures. The main empirical sections identify the 
experimentalist and harder elements of the Semester as applied to health and Energy 
Governance, before exploring their drivers. Finally, we use the experience of health in the 
Semester to identify six tentative lessons for energy under the Governance Regulation, namely: 
the importance of concrete implementation practices; the power of specificity to strengthen soft 
commitments; the role of policy coupling as a lever for implementation; the potential influence 
of strategic entrepreneurs; the role of politicisation in pressuring for change; and the 
significance of periodic revision as windows of opportunity for incremental change.  
1. Analysing HSG 
Soft governance is an ideal-typical mode of governance characterised by a voluntary, non-
hierarchical decision-making process based on coordination, communication and learning; it 
produces rules that are not legally binding (Trubek & Trubek 2005). It can be contrasted with 
the top-down, centralised, and rule-based model of hard governance, which produces treaties 
and laws enforceable by Courts.  
4 
We draw on Sabel and Zeitlin’s (2010) well-established soft governance model - the 
Experimentalist Governance framework - to map key features and logics of the Semester in 
health policy and assess similarities and differences with the Governance Regulation. We 
complement this with the HSG framework (Ringel & Knodt 2018; Knodt & Schoenefeld 2020) 
to identify their embedded harder elements.  
1.1. Mapping Experimentalist Governance architectures 
Sabel and Zeitlin (2010, p. 13) identify four elements characteristic of an experimentalist model 
of governance, linked in an ongoing, iterative cycle. First, broad ‘framework goals’ are agreed 
jointly at the higher governance level, and metrics adopted so that progress can be measured. 
Second, responsibility for pursuing these goals rests with the ‘lower level units’ and these units 
are given considerable discretion. Third, the condition of this discretion is regular reporting, 
peer review of performance and public justification of decisions; this facilitates scrutiny, 
contestation and participation by a wider range of actors (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008). Finally, the 
goals, metrics and procedures of decision-making themselves are periodically subject to 
revisions in response to learning in the earlier stages, and the cycle repeats.  
This model is predominantly soft, based on cooperation and learning. As for the hardened 
elements that may induce cooperation, Experimentalist Governance points to the concept of 
‘penalty defaults’ (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2010, p. 14) as a driver for member states to engage in soft 
governance. Keohane and Victor define penalty defaults as: 
‘a form of enforcement that does not prescribe solutions – which may be impossible 
to agree on because states likely to be targeted will block them – but that forces the 
actors to cooperate unless they are willing to risk losing control of their joint fate’ 
(2015, p. 207). 
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Penalty defaults involve an alternative to cooperation that is ‘so manifestly unworkable to the 
parties as to count as a draconian penalty’ (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008, p. 308) and therefore does 
not require the potential intervention of a superior authority to induce cooperation. Examples 
include market exclusion, threat of regulatory intervention or trade sanctions. Penalty defaults 
can be distinguished from the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (e.g. Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008), which 
refers to the authorities’ ability to actively and purposefully impose an unwanted outcome on 
cooperating parties in case of lack of agreement, inducing them into reaching a compromise. 
Beyond this, there is little within Experimentalist Governance to account for the harder 
elements increasingly embedded in soft governance frameworks. We therefore complement 
with the HSG framework. 
1.2. Hardening soft governance 
Knodt and Schoenefeld (2020) identify more precisely a series of mechanisms which have been 
introduced to harden soft governance (or to soften hard governance) and are characteristic of 
the emerging but distinct hybrid HSG model. These are both formal and informal, and apply at 
different stages of the policy-making process (goal setting, monitoring and enforcement). They 
include the introduction of ‘hard’ targets or implementation mechanisms which reshape 
voluntarism (A); naming, blaming and shaming via publication of public databases, rankings, 
reports and other information (B); institutionalising political entrepreneurs and strengthening 
their political role (C); requiring justification of (in)action by member states (D); coupling 
policy fields to create linked  financial incentives or sanctions (E); introducing sanctions or 
penalties for non-compliance (F); and including a mandate for Commission tertiary legislation 
such as implemented or delegated acts (G). The authors acknowledge that this is not an 
exhaustive list and encourage empirical studies to identify additional mechanisms. This article 
responds to that call and adds three further mechanisms (see Table 1): recommendations that 
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are highly tangible and specific (H); a high threshold, such as consensus or a super-majority, 
for making amendments to recommendations or change policy instruments (I); more intensive 
policy surveillance is initiated when certain conditions are met (J).  
1.3. Drivers of the hardening of soft governance 
In seeking to analyse the interests and political dynamics that are driving the shift towards 
HSG, Experimentalist Governance and the wider literature on New Modes of Governance 
(NMGs) to which it belongs, offer some hypotheses.  
Experimentalist Governance explains the development of iterative bottom-up governance 
processes as functionally necessary in a context of strategic uncertainty and polyarchic 
distribution of power. Sabel and Zeitlin (2008) argue that Experimentalist Governance is better 
suited to respond to a deeply uncertain and changing context than a strictly hierarchical one. 
Goals and instruments can be periodically adjusted in a more agile fashion based on learning 
or in response to emerging issues. A polyarchic distribution of power between a wide range of 
actors - public and private and operating at different governance levels - makes it also 
necessary, they argue, to have a more horizontal, open and transparent process, that can tap 
into all actors’ expertise and bring them on board. 
A second line of argument, recurring in the literature on NMGs, stresses the ability of soft 
governance frameworks to address the issue of non-compliance with hard law by reinforcing 
joint ownership of commonly agreed decisions (Saurrugger & Terpan, 2016, p. 57). Some 
authors highlight learning processes and creation of common norms as important to successful 
implementation and compliance (Radaelli, 2008). The compliance argument remains highly 
contested, however. Saurugger and Terpan (2016) find, for instance, that compliance with soft 
law is no more common than with hard.  
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A third line of argument points out that a core motivation for adopting soft governance 
frameworks is to overcome paralysis resulting from vetoes and divisions. A key advantage of 
soft law is that it is easier to agree than hard law, and this is ‘especially true when the actors 
are states that are jealous of their autonomy and when the issues at hand challenge state 
sovereignty’ (Abbott and Snidal, 2000, p. 423). Soft governance enables governments to: 
overcome disagreement; surmount resistance; limit sovereignty losses and keep control of key 
decisions; and shift the blame towards the EU (Schaëfer, 2006, pp. 83-84). In the EU context, 
soft governance - often based on an intergovernmental and decentralised mode - can be seen 
as a means of policy expansion into ‘new’ areas which had remained excluded from European 
integration due to sovereignty concerns, making cooperation possible while limiting 
sovereignty losses (Bickerton et al., 2015). It also enables supranational institutions, and 
particularly the Commission, to extend their authority and influence. 
Decision-makers might adopt soft law in the expectation that it will act as a precursor to hard 
law, or so as to use the threat of this potential evolution to push parties into compliance - 
something akin to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008). When this is not a 
workable or effective strategy, because of a lack of formal competencies or enduring resistance 
by key veto players, HSG frameworks may become the preferred, middle ground approach. 
The hardening of soft governance, then, is a response to the perceived problems of soft 
governance in the absence of strict legal enforcement and aims to strike a balance between 
autonomy and effectiveness. 
1.4. Methodology 
The Semester is a horizontal governance architecture (Borras & Radaelli, 2011), meaning its 
recommendations target a range of policy areas; by contrast, the Governance Regulation 
applies only to energy and climate policy. Drawing lessons from the Semester for the 
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Governance Regulation thus requires us to focus on its operation in a specific policy sector. 
We use the Semester’s impact upon health policy as a case study. The Semester was not 
designed as a tool of health governance but, since health makes up a significant proportion of 
national expenditure, health systems became a target of efforts to induce fiscal sustainability. 
In light of this, and as the Semester has become institutionalised at the core of the EU 
governance system, health actors have been forced to respond, engage, mitigate and, 
increasingly, to exploit its processes in pursuit of health objectives (Greer & Brooks, 
forthcoming). It has thus become a tool of health governance, and one used proactively, in 
some cases, by actors seeking to shape national health systems.  
The use of health within the Semester to draw lessons for the energy Governance Regulation 
is guided by the considerable similarities in the historical political and legal contexts of these 
two sectors. In both, responsibility is split and, whilst the EU has accumulated significant 
influence, national governments remain wary of ceding competences. Integration has relied on 
the application and extension of internal market rules, as well as interdependency with related 
policy areas, such as competition, trade, security and climate, reflecting the ‘nexus quality’ of 
both sectors (Ringel & Knodt, 2018, p. 210). In both, dedicated legal bases were only 
established more recently, at Maastricht (for health) and Lisbon (for energy), and only enable 
use of the ordinary legislative procedure in specific issue areas, which include public health on 
the one hand, and renewable energy, the internal energy market and energy efficiency on the 
other. In areas of greater sensitivity – such as the organisation and financing of health systems, 
and the energy mix respectively – the EU’s involvement is restricted. 
The article’s empirical basis is a primary documentary analysis and data from 21 semi-
structured, anonymous elite interviews. Documentary analysis included the core documents of 
the European Semester and of the Governance Regulation - complemented by press reports - 
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and served to map the instruments, processes, mechanisms and actors involved in each 
governance architecture. This was complemented by interviews conducted between 2015 and 
2018 with key actors, including those representing EU institutions and member states (see 
appendix 1). 
 
2. The hardening of health governance via the European Semester 
2.1 The Semester as a tool of experimental health governance 
The European Semester is the EU’s fiscal planning process, synchronising the surveillance, 
reporting and enforcement elements of both the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – which sets 
targets for national debt and deficits – and the Europe 2020 Strategy – which promotes jobs 
and growth in the Union. It responds to perceived weaknesses of the Economic and Monetary 
Union and the SGP, following the economic crisis, by establishing an ongoing process of 
surveillance of national budgets. The cycle starts with the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), in 
which the Commission assesses priorities for the EU. National governments communicate their 
plans in response to this, and the EU makes recommendations to each member state. Though 
formally non-binding, these Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) can trigger coercive 
responses for those countries subject to the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) or the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), since these are based on the Six Pack and the 
Two Pack legislation. In each of these instances, sanctions are decided by reverse-qualified 
majority voting, meaning that they are imposed automatically save for a blocking vote by a 
qualified majority. As such, whilst it draws heavily on the instruments and processes of the 
OMC, what distinguishes the Semester is the potential for its ‘soft’ recommendations to 
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become ‘hard’ requirements where member states fail to abide by the rules (Bauer & Becker, 
2014). 
Health at the EU level has historically been governed by policy frameworks and competences 
outside of health, such as the internal market, but the Semester constitutes a marked change in 
two ways. Firstly, it extends EU action into the realm of healthcare financing and organisation 
– arguably the most sensitive area of national health policy. Secondly, it does so using a 
combination of soft and hard instruments, making member states’ discretion to ignore 
recommendations dependent upon their fiscal situation (Stamati & Baeten, 2015; interview 19). 
Few of these instruments are new to health – not least of all because most are duplicated from 
the healthcare OMC – but the extent to which they are binding, their linkage with other policies 
and the scale of the policy surveillance which accompanies them is novel. 
The Semester’s framework goals are set by the AGS and there were originally three 
overarching priorities: ‘rigorous fiscal consolidation’, ‘labour market reforms’ and ‘growth-
enhancing measures’ (Commission, 2010). For health, the goals in the AGS have varied in their 
specificity, with early Surveys calling for broad reforms to promote ‘cost-effectiveness and 
sustainability’ (Commission, 2011, p. 5) and later iterations providing more detailed 
encouragement to ‘provide quality health care through efficient structures, including eHealth’ 
(Commission, 2014, p. 13), for instance. The CSRs embody the agreed routes by which 
member states will pursue the goals, in light of their particular national contexts, and thus serve 
as metrics by which progress can be measured. For example, CSRs might advise member states 
to ‘implement…administrative reform with a view to better cost-effectiveness of…healthcare 
services’ (Council of the EU, 2016, p. 82).  
Whilst the Semester implements the hard targets of the SGP – which limit government deficits 
to 3% of GDP and debts to 60% of GDP and are sanctionable save for a reverse qualified 
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majority vote – it does not set its own hard framework goals. The exception here is the EDP 
and the MIP, in which member states that have deviated from the 3% and 60% ceilings are 
issued with recommendations drawn from the CSRs, and face sanctions if they do not comply 
(mechanisms A and F). In one instance, this has presented a remarkable situation for health 
policy. Whilst under the EDP, France was issued a CSR urging it to restructure its health 
workforce policy by abolishing a long-standing annual limit on the recruitment of medical 
students (European Council, 2015). France exited the EDP relatively quickly and thus escaped 
having to comply with the requirement, but was subject to enhanced surveillance (mechanism 
J). The case illustrates the potential for the hardening of a framework goal to lead to 
unprecedented EU oversight of health policy (Greer & Jarman, 2018). 
The lower-level units responsible for achieving the Semester’s framework goals are the 
member states. Governments are required to submit: 1. Stability or Convergence Programmes, 
which serve as public reporting on adjustment towards the SGP rules; 2. National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs), detailing progress towards the goals of Europe 2020; and 3. for euro area 
states, Draft Budgetary Programmes, through which the EU exercises ex ante control over 
fiscal policies (mechanism B). In the NRPs, for instance, governments must specify precisely 
which policies they will introduce. For example, Belgium’s 2014 NRP details the specific 
instrument introduced to assess patients and various other policies which will contribute to 
achieving the CSR on increasing the cost-effectiveness of long-term care (Belgian government, 
2014, pp. 8-9) (mechanism H).  
The framework goals, metrics and processes of the Semester have changed considerably since 
it was launched in 2010, through periodic revisions. The literature has identified a process of 
‘socialisation’ of the Semester (Zeitlin & Vanhercke, 2018), and traces the increasing emphasis 
on social objectives. More specifically, health actors have engaged in the Semester process and 
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employed various strategies to undermine its original, narrow focus: the broadening of goals, 
the expansion of the scope of conflict and the nuancing of indicators (Greer & Brooks, 
forthcoming). Since its inception, the Semester’s framework goals have broadened from cost-
containment to universal access to healthcare (as featured in the latest AGS); the community 
of actors involved has expanded; and the metrics used to monitor progress have been 
challenged and nuanced to include, for instance, data on unmet medical need and out-of-pocket 
payment for health services (interview 18).  
2.2 The harder edge of the Semester  
There are three main sources of hardening within the Semester. Firstly, high thresholds for 
change have been introduced (mechanism I). Overturning of fines for non-compliance with the 
deficit procedure requires a reverse qualified majority, and amendment of the CSRs requires a 
‘reinforced’ qualified majority in the Council. This is combined with a ‘comply or explain’ rule 
compelling the Council to publicly justify the change sought (Zeitlin & Vanhercke, 2018, p. 
161), a requirement that amendments may not ‘reduce a member state’s effort’, and a short 
timeframe for their agreement; ‘as a result, no substantial amendments to health CSRs have yet 
been approved by the Council’ (Baeten & Vanhercke, 2017, pp. 489-90).  
A second element of HSG is the institutionalisation of political entrepreneurs – namely, civil 
society actors (mechanism C).1 For instance, the Semester has evolved to provide for greater 
involvement of health ministries, civil society actors and the Commission’s health directorate, 
whilst the latter has significantly increased its expertise in health system performance 
assessment and aggregation of country-specific health information to ensure its involvement 
(Brooks, 2015; interviews 14, 18, 19). 
                                               
1 On its ‘socialisation’ see Zeitlin & Vanhercke (2018); on its undermining see Greer & Brooks, (forthcoming). 
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Finally, instances of policy coupling can be seen. Most importantly, the rules of the 2014-2020 
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) - the five funds constituting the EU’s main 
redistributive financial instruments - enable the EU to request a government to direct part of 
any funding that it receives in pursuit of its CSRs and to suspend payments where insufficient 
progress is made,(mechanism E; Stamati & Baeten, 2015, p. 185). Conversely, should a 
government wish to finance health – for instance by investing in the creation of a new national 
health insurance system – it must submit a strategy for review by the Commission, for potential 
inclusion in the next round of CSRs (Baeten & Vanhercke, 2017, p. 491). This coupling and 
conditionality theoretically increases pressure to implement the CSRs. However, it is worth 
noting two points. The first is that use of ESIF funds has to be justified according to objectives 
wider than health alone - such as employment, innovation and growth - something that health 
actors have not historically been good at (Greer et al., 2019, p. 172). The second is that, in 
practice, the EU generally prefers to adopt a flexible approach. When tested for the first time, 
by failure to bring excessive deficits under control by the Spanish and Portuguese governments 
in 2016, the institutions declined to suspend funds or apply sanctions, raising questions about 
the mandatory and quasi-automatic nature of the conditionalities (Sacher, 2019).  
In sum, the HSG elements of the Semester better facilitate broad shaping of the policy context 
than hard enforcement of specific provisions. The high thresholds for change via the Council 
meant that few CSRs have been amended this way, and whilst policy coupling has created some 
leverage for the institutions, resistance to formal sanctions remains. However, by involving 
themselves at the agenda-setting stage, political entrepreneurs have become key actors in the 
drafting and contextualisation of the recommendations, and have used the iterative revision of 
the process to expand, nuance and blur its focus.   
2.3 The drivers of HSG in health governance 
14 
When assessing the drivers of HSG in health governance a distinction must be made between 
the interests and political intentions behind the European Semester as a whole, and its 
integration into EU health governance in particular. The Semester is intended to prevent future 
economic instability, rather than to introduce HSG into EU health policy specifically. It was 
driven by a need to address non-compliance with the SGP whilst being mindful of sovereignty 
concerns (Savage & Howarth, 2018). As a tool of health governance, the drivers of the 
Semester’s expansion are slightly different. Greer and Vanhercke identify clearly the default 
penalty which encouraged health actors to engage in the OMC on health: ‘the penalty for lack 
of action is progressive submission to internal market law as extended in an unpredictable, 
case-by-case manner’ (2010, p. 222). The EU has no mandate to govern the areas of health 
organisation and financing which are targeted by the Semester and, as such, member states are 
unlikely to be concerned about interference via an alternative mechanism. Instead, the penalty 
is that actors with less knowledge of (and potentially regard for) health, led by the 
Commission’s Economic and Financial Affairs directorate, will be responsible for drafting 
recommendations which impact upon health (Stamati & Baeten, 2015, p. 189; interview 20). 
Health ministers were initially induced to engage by the realisation that, otherwise, their 
counterparts in treasury and finance ministries would continue to make policy which affected 
health without due concern (interviews 15, 16; Fierlbeck, 2014, p. 93). They were struck by 
the reality that ‘even if they are not at the [Semester] table, they will remain on the menu’ 
(interview 17).  
Clearly, then, part of what has driven engagement with the Semester is the reality of its impact 
upon national health policy, however indirect, and the decision by some actors to make 
proactive use of its mechanisms. At the extreme end of this characterisation, the Semester is 
understood to offer “new opportunities to … defend and mainstream EU social objectives” and 
is utilised by social policy actors as such (Zeitlin & Vanhercke, 2018, p. 150;). At the very 
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least, the health-related elements of the Semester are now being driven by health actors who 
see an opportunity to consolidate and extend the EU’s nascent health system agenda (interviews 
24, 25; Brooks, 2015).  
In this regard, the force now driving HSG within health policy is the Commission and, in 
particular, its health directorate. Extension of EU influence into health systems organisation 
and financing might not have been a goal of the Commission prior to the crisis – though Baeten 
and Thomson (2012) trace the origins of EU interest in this field back to the mid-1990s – and 
soft law in this area is unlikely to lead to subsequent legislation, given that the treaties explicitly 
preclude EU involvement. However, states now receive CSRs on areas core to health system 
organisation (Azzopardi-Muscat et al., 2015, p. 380), marking a significant step forward in 
health integration, and creative opportunists within the Commission have moved beyond 
reactive management of this new influence into proactive utilisation and shaping of it (Greer 
& Brooks, forthcoming). Moreover, they have been supported by a network of civil society 
actors, vocal in contesting the ownership of finance actors over the process and demanding a 
role for themselves and the European Parliament (Stamati & Baeten, 2015, p. 189).  
3. The Governance Regulation: softening or hardening energy governance?  
3.1. The Governance Regulation as experimentalist energy governance 
EU energy policies have mainly developed as hard law, in the form of a growing body 
directives and regulations (Kanellakis et al. 2013). Energy was included in early cycles of the 
Semester but remained peripheral, being less relevant to the Semester’s original fiscal 
objectives, and did not feature prominently in the CSRs (interviews 2, 4).  
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The Energy Union constitutes a partial shift in energy governance towards a more decentralised 
and bottom up - i.e. soft - process (Bocquillon & Maltby, 2020; Ringel & Knodt, 2018). It 
introduces an innovative piece of legislation to monitor national efforts, progress and 
compliance with headline energy and climate objectives, modelled on the Semester at member 
states’ request (interviews 1, 3, 12). 
Applying the Experimentalist Governance framework, the Governance Regulation contains 
mechanisms similar to those in the Semester. First, its framework goals – including the 2030 
targets for GHG emission reductions (-40% binding at EU and national levels), renewable 
energy supply (32% binding at EU-level only) and energy efficiency (32.5% non-binding) – 
are defined centrally and associated legislation, such as the revised Renewable Energy 
Directive, define precisely how to measure progress. Second, a novel ‘pledge and review’ 
process is introduced (Oberthür, 2019).  
Similarly to the Semester, member states, as the ‘lower level units’, have submitted integrated 
10-year National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) to the Commission by 2019, representing 
their contribution towards meeting the framework goals. Existing reporting requirements, 
such as those within the Renewable and Energy Efficiency Directives, are streamlined. The 
draft NECPs include information defined in broad terms in the Governance Regulation and 
further specified through Commission templates and a continuous informal dialogue with 
member states (mechanism J). Taking stock of national pledges and any identified ambition 
(and later implementation) gaps, the Commission can issue non-binding recommendations to 
member states.  
Finally, these processes are subject to periodic revision. The annual State of the Energy Union 
report will track progress towards EU objectives. The Commission will also have close 
oversight in reviewing biennial progress reports on NECPs’ implementation from 2021 (article 
17 
17), and by 2023 will review progress towards achieving the 2030 goals and Paris Agreement 
commitments, ‘including provision for a review and potential increase in the Union-level 
target’ (EP & the Council, 2018a, p. 5). The increase in renewable and energy efficiency 
targets, pushed by the European Parliament and eventually adopted by the more reluctant but 
divided Council between 2014 and 2018, demonstrates the potential for upward revision 
(Bocquillon & Maltby, 2020).  
3.2. The harder edge of the Governance Regulation 
Some energy and climate objectives are binding and enforceable by the Court. These include 
national emission reduction targets in sectors not covered by the Emission Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS), eco-design provisions and sub-targets included in the Energy Efficiency Directive 
(mechanisms A, F). A high threshold for change exists within the associated legislation, where 
several targets and obligations are made binding and change would require the Commission to 
issue new legislative proposal(s) (mechanism I).  
Specificity is also key to the hardening of softer targets. Although the renewable energy target 
is only binding at the EU level, included in an Annex is an indicative formula for the calculation 
of national objectives to achieve the EU goal (EP & the Council, 2018b: Annex II) (mechanism 
H). These provide a clear benchmark to assess individual national failures and shame ‘laggards’ 
(interviews 5, 9) (mechanism B). Indeed, in its recommendations of June 2019 on the very first 
NECPs, the Commission used the formula to recommend more renewables ambition from 12 
states (Euractiv, 2019). In addition, the monitoring process has been strengthened through 
precisely defined but indicative national renewable trajectories towards meeting the final 
national targets - including three reference points (Articles 4.2 & 29).   
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The shadow of legislative instruments is also important. The Commission is empowered to 
adopt delegated acts to bring the Governance Regulation in line with the evolution of the EU’s 
long-term energy and climate strategy as part of the Paris agreement (Article 43) (mechanism 
G). Evaluating NECPs, if there is an ambition or implementation gap, the Commission ‘shall 
propose measures and exercise its powers at Union level... to ensure the collective achievement 
of…objectives and targets’ (Article 31). Within the EU's energy competences, the Commission 
can therefore propose, or threaten to propose, new legislation if member states are not on track 
towards their objectives, exposing them to the vagaries of coalition politics in the Council and 
influence of the European Parliament. 
The NECPs and recommendations are made public, and it is hoped that this increased 
transparency will facilitate peer pressure from other governments at the EU level, and public 
criticism by, “opening up space to civil society to pressure national governments” (interview 
1), forcing public justification and shaping policy (interviews 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11) (mechanisms B, 
C, D). The publication of the Commission’s first summary of recommendations in June 2019 
(Commission, 2019) was followed by extensive media coverage and criticism from NGOs (The 
Guardian, 2019).  
Finally, the Governance Regulation couples the processes of reporting and monitoring for 
energy and climate, in pursuit of better coherence and coordination between the two sectors 
(interviews 7, 8) (mechanism E). Arguably, the policy coupling of energy and climate policy, 
a more established policy area which benefits from strong support and momentum, can be 
interpreted as a way to consolidate EU energy policy. 
3.3. The drivers of HSG in energy governance 
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Functionally, a flexible model of Experimentalist Governance reinforced by harder features is 
well suited to accommodate the diversity of national energy mixes, political infrastructures and 
institutional settings. This is compounded by the multiplicity of actors involved at national and 
EU level (polyarchic distribution of power). The Governance Regulation might also suit an 
energy transition in which longer-term dynamics of technological and social change are 
uncertain and difficult to predict (strategic uncertainty). A key example here is the recent rapid 
decrease in the renewable energy costs. Regular stock-taking and revision of goals could allow 
learning and adaptation to these changes. The ‘pledge and review’ process is partially modelled 
on the Semester but also, and perhaps more importantly, on the 2015 Paris [Climate] 
Agreement, which is decentralised and non-binding at the national level (Oberthür, 2019). 
Recurring stocktaking and revisions make it possible to adapt the Governance Regulation to 
the evolution of international negotiations. 
More importantly, the principal driver is member states’ concerns about sovereignty. These 
have long limited national governments’ willingness to delegate further power to the EU level 
in energy policy (Bocquillon & Maltby 2020), and the exploitation of national energy 
resources, determination of the energy mix and taxation have indeed remained firmly national 
prerogatives. It is largely on sovereignty grounds that the European Council did not endorse 
binding national renewable energy targets in 2014 (The Guardian, 2014), and many member 
states were adamant about retaining their ability to define their own national policies 
(interviews 3, 6, 8, 13). Where powers for the Commission can be argued to have been 
enhanced, including the surveillance and publicity of member state plans, this is linked to, and 
compensation for, the removal of national targets for renewables (interviews 8, 10). In the 
absence of hard national targets enforceable by the Court, Commission, European Parliament 
and some member states were concerned about the ability of the EU to reach its collective 
target and about the risk of free-riding by less ambitious countries (interviews 10, 13). The 
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Governance Regulation accommodates national sovereignty concerns and provides flexibility 
while inserting national plans into a collective monitoring process under the Commission’s 
leadership to facilitate convergence towards common objectives. It constitutes a partial 
softening of an already existing legal framework – for renewable energy – although with 
strengthened Commission monitoring powers (Oberthür, 2019). 
  
Table 1: HSG in Health and Energy 
Mechanism Health – European 
Semester 
Energy – Governance Regulation 
(A) ‘Hard’ 
targets/implementation 
The Semester implements 
binding SGP debt and 
deficit targets. 
GHG (EU & national) and 
renewable (EU only) targets 
binding. Energy efficiency 
headline target non-binding; 
specific targets binding. 
(B) Naming, blaming 
and shaming 
Country-specific analysis 
in the Country Reports; 
‘Social scoreboard’. 
NECP plans made public to 
increase transparency and peer 
pressure on laggards. 
(C) Institutionalising 
political entrepreneurs 
The institutionalised role 
of social actors and civil 
society. 
Publicising drafts, plans and gaps 
to foster civil society participation 
in/and accountability. 
(D) Justification Amendments to CSRs 
require public justification; 
National Reforms 
Programmes serve as 
justification on progress. 
Governments must publicly 
respond to Commission 
recommendations re ambition 
gap(s). 
(E) Policy field 
coupling 
Linked with European 
Structural and Investment 
Funds. 
Harnesses energy objectives to 
climate governance (e.g. emissions 
reporting). 
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(F) Sanctions Excessive Deficit 
Procedure and 
Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure both entail 
sanctions. 
Only climate targets enforced by 
Court. States required to follow 
the process (timely submission of 
plans, complete submission). 
(G) Tertiary legislation N/A. Commission can issue delegated 
acts to bring EU framework in line 
with the Paris Agreement, and 
propose secondary legislation if 
ambition/implementation gap. 
(H) Specificity / 
tangibility of 
recommendations 
CSRs and Country Reports 
identify tangible policy 
targets. 
Commission templates for NCEPs. 
Renewables formula provides 
guidance on objectives and 
benchmarks. 
(I) High threshold for 
amendment / change / 
input 
Amendment to CSRs and 
opposition to sanctions 
requires reinforced and 
reversed qualified majority 
respectively. 
Change to EU/national objectives 
requires legislative change under 
Ordinary Legislative Procedure, 
using Qualified Majority Voting 
(Commission proposal, agreement 
of Council and European 
Parliament). 
(J) Enhanced (or 
variable degrees of) 
surveillance 
Member states subject to 
EDP are subject to 
enhanced monitoring. 
Standardised, comprehensive 
process of reporting. Publication 
of detailed national plans, based 
on templates, enable the 
Commission to track progress. 
  
 
4. Lessons from the Semester for energy governance 
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Lesson-drawing from the Semester for the operation of the Governance Regulation must take 
account of the differing origins and intentions of these two architectures. Although the policy 
sectors share similar histories and politics, and even though the Governance Regulation is 
partly modelled on the Semester, there are several notable differences. At a most fundamental 
level, the Semester is a reactive, crisis-driven framework, which health has become part of 
without being its sole or main target, whilst the Governance Regulation seeks to set a positive, 
proactive agenda for further integration in energy. Dissimilar starting points have resulted in 
institutional differences, particularly the extent to which voluntarism is reshaped with hard 
obligations and sanctions. Energy encompasses a wider range of ‘harder’ legislative elements, 
which translates in the context of the Governance Regulation to a stronger backing - and 
shadow - of hierarchy. On the other hand, the scope of hard legislation is more limited in health 
but, where the EDP and other hard elements of the SGP apply, the Commission’s 
recommendations as part of the Semester are, in principle, stronger than in the Governance 
Regulation. In both sectors the picture is therefore contrasted, presenting a mix of harder and 
softer elements whose interactions are (or will be) key. 
A first lesson is that, as important as the interplay between binding and non-binding elements 
may be in principle, how they are applied in practice is (or will be) even more important. On 
the one hand, although sanctioning powers have yet to be tested as part of the Semester, the 
French case (discussed above) illustrates the potential implications of hardening mechanisms 
for specific policy sectors. On the other, we know from the experience of the SGP, where 
repeated French and German violations went unpunished (Chang, 2006), that the power to 
sanction is not the same as the will to sanction.  
A second and related point is that the changing political context and degree of politicisation of 
both processes is (or will be) decisive to their practical implementation, conditioning their 
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stringency. The implementation of the Semester has been dependent on the strength of 
consensus among member states about fiscal stabilisation, and on the willingness of the 
Commission to enforce it rigorously in the face of political costs - e.g. fuelling public backlash 
and rising Euroscepticism. Whilst the European Semester had the potential to become very 
political, to date it has not, remaining instead a largely technocratic exercise that is rarely 
reported in national media and that receives inconsistent attention from national parliaments 
(Kreilinger, 2018). Similarly, the implementation of the Governance Regulation is designed to 
politicise the planning, reporting and monitoring process by subjecting decisions to public 
debates at the national and EU levels and putting pressure member states who would be lagging 
behind in terms of commitments and/or implementation. Such politicisation will be important 
to determine its strength, or else may lead to a technocratic process, limiting its purchase. 
Third, the operation and evolution of the Governance Regulation will depend in large part upon 
the engagement and approach of relevant policy entrepreneurs. The health (and broader social) 
policy experience through the Semester illustrates the impact that this can have upon the 
direction and operation of the governance architecture, by altering objectives, for instance to 
better account for social goals, and increasing accountability. The Governance Regulation 
provides an avenue for the involvement of civil society and other actors, which is already 
drawing attention. If the Commission and European Parliament manage to seize this process as 
an opportunity to further extend their influence and work together with civil society, member 
states may find the careful delimitation of national and supranational responsibilities 
challenged and the scope of EU influence expanded.  
Fourth, policy coupling is an important and influential hardening mechanism. The Semester 
has strengthened linkages between EU funds – such as the ESIF – and broader policy 
objectives. In health, this has turned unrelated financial instruments into tools of leverage. 
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Similarly, where energy is linked to horizontal issues such as climate change, in which EU 
competences and legitimacy are more firmly established, this presents a potential avenue for 
further hardening of the Governance Regulation. Such linking is already present in the cross-
sectoral nature of the NECPs, which bundle different policy reporting and objectives together. 
It is not unforeseeable that political entrepreneurship on the part of the Commission combined 
with windows of political opportunity opened by crises and events will lead to an expansion of 
the reach of the Governance Regulation. 
Fifth, a key lesson from the health experience is the power of specificity. The health-related 
framework goals set in the AGS have become more precise, limiting governments’ flexibility 
and challenging their ability to claim compliance with vaguely worded recommendations 
(Baeten & Vanhercke, 2017). The potential for energy governance to utilise the same lever 
here is strong – the framework goals are already defined in a more precise manner (in the form 
of quantitative targets) and the creation of templates for structuring national plans promises a 
degree of tangibility which was missing from health-related recommendations in the early 
cycles of the Semester.  
Finally, the Semester illustrates how crucial the possibility for periodic revision – a key feature 
of Experimentalist Governance frameworks – is for the power of each of the mechanisms 
identified above. The Semester process has been continually adjusted, most notably to ensure 
the participation of civil society actors (Zeitlin & Vanhercke, 2018). Regular ‘re-opening’ of 
the Governance Regulation process and commitment to learning from its operation - through 
bi-annual reporting and the review clause, for instance - may create space for political 
entrepreneurs to shape its goals, advocate for greater policy coupling and coherence, and 
increase and guide the specificity of its content. There is potential for more precise and stringent 
obligations over time, but this is dependent on the broader context, including the continued 
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salience of energy and climate issues, as well as pressure arising from international climate 
negotiations. If the Governance Regulation fails to achieve the headline goals of the EU’s long-
term energy and climate strategy as part of the Paris agreement, some member states may be 
willing to strengthen the process further, and the shadow of new legislative proposals may sway 
the most reluctant of them.  
 
Conclusion 
At the EU level, there has been a shift towards the hardening of soft types of governance 
architectures. This is illustrated here through the case of health policy as part of the European 
Semester, and the new framework for energy governance. We show that energy policy’s 
Governance Regulation resembles and, indeed, has been inspired by the European Semester’s 
governance model. Combining the experimentalist and HSG frameworks, we identify a range 
of mechanisms aimed at ensuring not only cooperation in these sensitive areas, but also 
compliance in the absence (or incomplete nature) of strong legal guarantees.  
We find that this shift has been primarily driven by politics and reflects attempts to foster 
cooperation while alleviating member states’ enduring sovereignty concerns. In health policy, 
the activism of entrepreneurial actors and threat of penalty defaults in the form of leadership 
by non-health actors have been decisive in bringing key objectives under the harder edge of the 
Semester. In contrast, in energy, the shift towards HSG has been driven by a need to alleviate 
states’ sovereignty concerns whilst meeting climate and clean energy headline goals that 
member states have collectively bound themselves to.  
Inferring from the longer experience of health as part of the Semester, we point to six aspects 
that may be important to the future of the Governance Regulation: the practical implementation 
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of mechanisms; the power of specificity; the role of policy coupling; the potential influence of 
policy entrepreneurs; the role of politicisation; and the significance of periodic revisions. 
The extent to which a HSG architecture succeeds in terms of policy implementation and goal 
achievement in energy will be contingent upon member states’ enduring commitments to the 
process and headline goals. This in turn depends upon whether energy and climate policy 
remain high on national and EU agenda. The Governance Regulation could either facilitate a 
further politicisation, or instead remain a largely technocratic exercise, as demonstrated in the 
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